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The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, the authorpresents an immanent criticism of Berliner's definition of the
sociallegacy of communism as a "social contract" of sorts be-
tween the Party/State and population, within which he substituted
"the civil society" in communist countries. The author warns that
in this case there was no exchange of individual rights and free-
doms for social privileges, but the "exchange" of legitimacy (in fa-
vor of the elite) for social rights and privileges (in favor of the em-
ployees). This exchange also included a dual communication be-
tween the elite and masses. In the second part, the author indi-
cates that in 1983 he himself described this mechanism of legit-
imizing the power of the elite, which Berliner too considered the
basis of social stability, as the theory on "the coalition between
politocracy and physical workers", setting it into a broader context
of socialism's abortive economic reforms. In the third part, by
means of an analysis of cross-cultural empirical findings, "the
communist legacy" in Croatia is said to be much less preserved
than in other postcommunist countries. The author suggests an
interpretative hypothesis which attempts to explain this "Croatian
deviation".
Man needs bread, not freedom.
F. M. Dostoyevsky
PROLOGU E
The anticommunist revolution, which swept away socialist regimes inEurope-Asian countries by the end of the 1980's and at the beginning of
the 1990's, was accepted enthusiastically in the West, and euphorically in the
East. However, it failed to meet the expectations of both. Instead of a tri-
umphant arrival into the promised land flowing with milk and honey, ensuring
a high standard of living, political democracy and respect of human rights,
East-Europeans found themselves in the desert of Sinai, in the midst of an in-
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definitely long and tedious transition period.' A rapid ''transition to democracy"
was expected in the West. From this perspective, Eastern Europe, according
to Ken Jowitt, resembled "a historical blackboard written on with Leninist chalk
for forty years, erased (Iargely) by Soviet actions in 1989, and waiting, tabula
rasa, to be written on, now in liberal capitalist script." (Jowitt, 1992, 285-6). The
40-year cultural, political and economic legacy of Leninist rule was thus ig-
nored and treated in the same way Leninists after 1948 treated their own
Eastern European inheritance -as a collection of historically outmoded "sur-
vivals" bound to lose their cultural, social and psychological significance.
According to Jowitt , this was a grave intellectual mistake because, inheritors
have always been formed by their cultural and institutional legacies, for better
orworse. The Leninist legacy has thus shaped the development and outcomes
in Eastern Europe so far, and will continue to do so in the future.
lt is not our aim here to analyse the ways in which transition processes and
their outcomes have been shaped by the Leninist legacy or, even less, to pre-
dict final results which will not be the same in all postcommunist countries.' lt
is the aim of this paper to discuss an important part of the Leninist legacy
which is referred to by American experts as the "sociallegacy of communism,"
(Millar and Wolchik, 1994) and which has been intensively explored on the
empiricallevel. Special attention will be paid to this legacy in Croatia although
empirical data on the subject are scarce.
I. THE "SOCIAL CONTRACT" THEORY
1) An Operational Definition of the
"Social Legacy of Communism"
ln the introductory chapter entitled "Social legacies and aftermath of cornmu-
nism", Millar and Wolchik discuss social consequences of communism under
1
ln the same way as ancient Israelites, clamouring against Moses and Aaron, wanted to return from
Sinai to Egypt, 20 per cent of East Germans would like to restore the German Democratic
Republic. The number of people who looked back to the previous system with nostalgia grew from
10% to 20% in 1995. More than a half have been dissatisfied with the newly created social situa-
tion. (The figures are based on a survey carried out by Suddeutsche Zeitung, that was reported
about in Vjesnik, 5 January 1996)
2
Eastern socialism is often regarded as a historical aberration in the modernization process, while
transition is seen as a return from a side-track of historical development to its main road. It would
be more correct, however, to regard it as a stage in the process of social evolution than as a con-
version to "true faith" and rectification of mistakes. The process of evolution is a complicated
aleatory game with lats of blind alleys and failures. Only those who have managed to adapt can
survive. There are no guarantees that all countries which are now in the process of transition will
eventually reach the main road of development and continue to exist as modern societies. Some
will definitely fall to the level of underdeveloped countries of sub-Saharian Africa, which have no
historical chances.
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three broad headings: (1) legacies that flow from the tacit social contract be-
tween population and the state; (2) legacies that represent values, attitudes
and behavior that the state attempted to either instill or extirpate in the subject
population, and (3) 'the aftermath", that is, the unintended consequences of
communist rule. (Millar and Wolchik, 1994, 4).
The book abou nds in empirical data on phenomena belonging to the three
groups which are related primarily to the former USSR and some of the East-
European countries. The Socialist Yugoslavia and its successor states, includ-
ing Slovenia, have not been included in the research. I shall limit my comments
to the first two groups (i. e., social contract and values, attitudes and behav-
ior), leaving out the aftermath-effects as a heterogeneous category in which it
is often impossible to distinguish clearly specific consequences of communist
rule from similar phenomena which are encountered in non-communist coun-
tries.
The "social contract" consisted mainly of social entitlements, such as free ed-
ucation, free health care, cheap housing, job security, the stability of wages
and living standards (even though low), social security, old-age pensions, etc;
in short, it consisted of social benefits and social rights.
Legacies representing values and collective aUitudes comprise the attitudes
and values instilIed by communist rule, and those which had neither been ex-
plicitly proclaimed nor supported by the regime, but which evolved as a result
of living in the communist system. Belonging to this group are fundamental
norms of the Soviet regime, such as the state ownership of heavy industry,
state procurement of medical aid, the dominant role of the state in the pro-
duction and distribution of agricultural products and the legal supremacy of so-
cial rights over the rights of the individual who is charged with criminal offence.
Economic attitudes, such as preferences regarding the type of economic sys-
tems, attitudes to market economy, private ownership and economic reform
should also be listed here, as well as political attitudes to one-party and multi-
party system, democratic perspectives and the role of the individual in politics.
We shall not review here a large number of empirical data concerning these
issues. However, we would expect a book dealing with the "social dimension"
of transition to provide a theoretical sociological elaboration of the social lega-
cy of communism. Such elaboration, however, is completely missing from the
introductory chapter, and is provided as late as the final chapter, entitled
"Conclusion : Reflections on the Social Legacy of Communism" written by
Joseph S. Berliner. This may be due to the authors' agreement concerning the
organization of the book. (Millar and Wolchik, 1994, 379-385). We believe that
these considerations deserve a special comment here.
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2) Theoretical Reflections of Joseph Berliner
Berliner points out correctly that the concept of "legacy" should convey the so-
cial world of Soviet communism at the time of its departure from the historical
scene. It was due to the "social contract" that the Soviet society managed to
maintain a relative stability prior to 1985, before the advent of Gorbachev and
glasnost. The "social contract" provided the "social cement" which was crum-
bling away slowly. It replaced a societal void ("societa l-void theory') which had
been created by the supression or destruction of traditional institutions of so-
cial control, such as the family, the church, the ethnic group and other ele-
ments of civil society. These institutions were replaced by a system of controls,
imposed by the state and the party, which were based on the social contract
between the party and the people." The terms of that contract are familiar. The
people surrendered their rights to individual freedom, but they received in re-
turn such benefits as job security, free medical care and education for their
children, and a spare but adequate level of consumption. It made for a drab
way of life, but streets were free of crimes." (Millar and Wolchik, 1994,380-1)
Regardless of the extent to which the "social contract" acted as an adequate
substitute for civil society, it suffered from a serious drawback from the view-
point of party interests. The suppression of organized opposition enabled the
party to realize its aims without the fear of protest on the part of interest
groups. As a result, however, circumstances deteriorated so much that this fi-
nally precipitated the breakdown of the system. Berliner concludes his socio-
logical analysis of the "social contract" with these observations. I would like to
continue the analysis along the lines of his globalistic approach. I believe that
the "social contract" should be viewed in terms of the global social world of
communism, and I shall first analyze it in the former USSR and then in the for-
mer Yugoslavia.
3) An Attempt at (Re)interpretation of the "Social Contract"
We shall start from the highly simplified definition of "social contract" given by
Berliner. Its key word is "surrender." We must point out, however, that people
can surrender only something they have or aspire to have. It is therefore ap-
propriate to ask whether Russian citizens were actually in a position to sur-
render their right to individual freedom.
According to Soviet historian and dissident Andrey Amalrik, (Amalrik, 1970) in-
dividual rights in the Western sense of the word have never existed in the
whole history of Russia. All "individual rights" were in the hands of the tsarist
or Leninist absolutist state, which could grant them as a privilege or withold
them at will. They were not the "natural rights" of the individual. Aspirations to
individual rights and freedoms, which are self-evident in American culture,
have been completely lacking in Russian culture. To quote Amalrik: 'Whether
because of its historical traditions or for some other reason, the idea of self-
government, of equality before the law and of personal freedom - and the re-
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sponsibility that goes with these - are almost completely incomprehensible to
the Russian people ...To the majority of people the very word 'freedom' is syn-
onymous with 'disorder' or the opportunity to indulge in some kind of antisocial
or dangerous activity. As for respecting the rights of an individual as such, the
idea simply arises bewilderment. On can respect strength, authority, even in-
tellect or education but it is preposterous to the popular mind that the human
person should represent any kind of value. - As a people, we have not bene-
fited from Europe's humanist tradition. In Russian history, man has always
been a means and never in any sense an end." (Amalrik, 1970, 33-34)
What could the Russian masses give in return for social benefits? Not the in-
dividual rights to freedom, but the social legitimacy to authoritarian rule. That
rule could not found its legitimacy upon the traditional authority of the tzar: he
was done away with not only as a person, but as the institution as well.
According to communist ideology, the authorities and the party could be given
legitimacy only by the working class, which in return got what it had asked for,
Le. social entitlements.
Although Berliner fails to see the legitimation function of the contract, he is
aware of its consequence, Le. social stability. The legitimacy of rule as a pre-
requisite of social stability presupposes some kind of value consensus.' This
implies that the ruling elite should endorse (or at least tolerate) certain values
and attitudes of the masses, and that the masses, for their part, should en-
dorse certain values and attitudes of the elite, even though passively.
Consequently, the content of the contract "package" cannot be reduced to so-
cial entitlements, but should include mutual communication between the "con-
tracting parties". As opposed to Berliner's general methodological instruction,
a reductionist view distinguishes the legacy proceeding from the "contract"
from ideas and attitudes which the elite tried to instill in the population. In oth-
er words, the communication system, as an integral part of the "social con-
tract," is set apart from the content of the "contract" and is, furthermore, re-
duced to the top-bottom communication between the elite and the masses, ne-
gleeting the bottom-top communication between the masses and the elite.
The authors of the book were not the only ones who ignored the bottom-top
communication simply because they could not understand its content, which is
that of "radical egalitarianism". This orientation was excellently described by
Amalrik who nevertheless failed to provide its adequate interpretation.
3
The idea of a value consensus in totalitarian countries might seem morally unacceptable to those who
have undergone the process of socialization in democratic societies. No totalitarian regime, howev-
er, could persist long without a consensus of a kind. Thus Liah Greenfelf is right when she points out,
referring to Max Weber, that the Nazi regime in Germany would not have lasted for a week without
the popular collaboration and support. For, "no system of authority, no society, exists for any length
of time if it is not legitimate and cannot claim voluntary obedience from the mass of its subjects. The
Nazis understood this as well as any. Perhaps they understood it better than most ..." L. Greenfeld
(1993), Nationalism, Harvard University Press, p. 384. Ervin Staub convincingly explained the idea
of consensus on the socio-psychological level in terms of the relationship between the Leader and
his followers. Ervin Staub (1994) The Roots of Evil, Cambridge University Press, p. 23-24.
A ••ft
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"The Russian people, as can be seen from both their past and present histo-
ry, have at any rate one idea that appears positive: the idea of justice. The gov-
ernment that thinks and acts in everything for us must be not only strong but
also just. All must live justly and act justly.
lt is worth being burnt at the stake for that idea, but not for the right to 'do as
you wish' ... In practice, [ustice' involves the desire that 'nobody should live bet-
ter than I do' (but not the desire for the much-vau nted notion of equalizing
wages, since the fact that many people live worse is willingly accepted).
This idea of justice is motivated by hatred of everything that is outstanding,
which we make no effort to imitate but, on the contrary, try to bring down to our
level, by hatred of any sense of initiative, of any higher or more dynamic way
of life than the life we live ourselves. This psychology is, of course, most typi-
cal of peasantry, and least typical of the 'middle class'. However, peasants and
those of peasant origin constitute the overwhelming majority in our country.
As I have observed myself, many peasants find someone else's success more
painful than their own failure. In general, when the average Russian sees that
he is living less well than his neighbor, he will concentrate not on trying to do
better for himself but rather on trying to bring his neighbor down to his own lev-
el. My reasoning may seem naive to some people, but I have been able to ob-
serve scores of examples in both Village and town, and I see in this one of the
typical traits of the Russian psyche." (Amalrik, 1970, 34-35)
ln this passage, Amalrik described excellently the radical - egalitarian value
orientation, but he misinterpreted it as-a characteristic typical of the Russian
soul. Leaving aside the fact that the "Russian" or the "Slavic soul" is an intel-
lectual construct forged by intellectuals in the course of the historical develop-
ment of Russian nationalism, (Greenfeld, 1993, 256-258) the same feature
could easily be ascribed to the "Croatian soul" or, more or less precisely, to the
"Croatian envy" (in Croatian "jan. That envy, however, is characteristic of oth-
er republics in the former Yugoslavia as well, as I showed with a number of il-
lustrative examples in my study on egalitarianism. (Županov, 1969) Amalrik's
observation regarding the peasant roots of egalitarianism is correct. The phe-
nomenon had been described earlier by Barrington Moore. (14,497-8) lt does
not follow, however, that egalitarian orientation is a characteristic of the "peas-
ant soul"; it actually arises from a given social situation.
The closed traditional peasant community could be taken as an example.
According to G.M.Foster, the worldview of this community is dominated by the
image of limited good. (Foster, 1963) All· material and non-material goods are
limited in quantity and cannot be enlarged by human effort.' ln cases where
4
Economic goods cannot be expanded by greater effort in a situation where the available land is
limited and technology is stagnant.
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the quantity of goods is fixed, the distribution is that of the "zero-sum-game"
type: what is gained by A is lost to B.5 The requirement of justice can be met
only by egalitarian distribution, i.e., if A and B get equal shares.
To be sure, the closed traditional community is a borderline (historical) case to-
day. However, egalitarian value orientation is functional in any situation of ab-
solute deprivation, Le. of serious scarcity of essential goods, from which the
individual cannot extricate himself by his own effort, relying on a competitive
mechanism. A group of shipwrecked persons on a boat can be taken as a par-
adigmatic example, although this is also a borderline case. Such deprivation is
possible in other cases," especially in the "economy of scarcity." A case in point
is socialist economy which was marked by low salaries and the lack of com-
petitive mechanisms that an individual could rely upon. This was due to the
fact that the labor market did not exist, and private enterprise was not allowed
institutionally. In this situation it is certainly not just that anyone should live "bet-
ter than I do"; and if someone does, this is certainly at my expense, so that he
should by all means be "called to order".' ln short, if someone lives better than
I do, it is unjust and immoral. It is much easier to get over one's loss, being
merely a sad fact, than another's gain (success). In the distribution of the "ze-
ro-sum-game type", the moral code of the community is broken by individual
success. To quote Pareto, people are more willing to tolerate poverty than
moral disorder.
The hatred of personal affirmation and initiative should also be understood in
the light of the "limited good", which refers to non-material goods as well. Thus
5
The idea is expressed in the popular prove rb: One man's loss is another man's gain.
6
The situation was like that at the time of protracted reductions of electricity, which were frequent in
Croatia in the 1980's. I shall evoke here a personal experience. In my neighbourhood, the elec-
tricity was switched off in all buildings except for a skyscraper connected to a transformer station
which supplied a medical centre with electricity. The Iighted windows on the skyscraper at the time
when all the other buildings were in darkness caused strong resentment, which grew even stronger
because people living in the privileged skyscraper put electric lamps and reflectors on their win-
dows and baiconies. It was technically possible to cut the supply to the skyscraper without leaving
the medical center without electricity. One day, this was actually done: when the lights on the sky-
scraper went off, we all felt relief. We did not gain anything, but 'they' were finally called to order!
7
The market mechanism was replaced by a mechanism of political loyalty, which enabled some peo-
ple to gain certain privileges. Thus, for instance, one did not have to queue in front of shops be-
cause he could get everything he needed in special shops. Of course, these were not available to
anyone. The mechanism of primary social relationships such as the family, ethnic and local ties on
the one hand, and professional connections on the other, enabled some people to get preferential
treatment in obtaining goods and services. Thus, for instance, a doctor did not have to waste his
time in waiting rooms if he needed medical help as a patient. These mechanisms were not avail-
able to everyone. When an ordinary line crasher wanted to get something without waiting for his
turn, this could provoke a true outrage which stopped short of physical force to get him back to the
place where he belonged. Those who could neither use political loyalty nor primary social relation-
ships and professional connections had only bribery to resort to.
.4~1
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an individual, who builds up a good reputation due to his superior intellectual
qualities, breaks the moral code of the community, and must exonerate him-
self by sacrificing some of the material goods.8 Personal initiative and inven-
tiveness, as deviations from traditional routines, are also liable to disrupt the
balance of community and are therefore regarded as undesirable.
The breakthrough of market and monetary economy has disrupted traditional
peasant communities, while industrialization brought the process to the close.
Communities have disappeared as social structure but, contrary to
Tomasevich's view, have persisted as a "state of mind" (Tomasevich, 1955).
Market economy (even without intensive industrialization) and industrialization
(even though socialist) have opened up new possibilities to individuals who
could thus get a larger share of the "cake" than it would be possible according
to the egalitarian codex of distribution. Furthermore, the post-traditional econ-
omy has entailed or strenghtened individualist and utilitarian values. As a re-
sult, while remaining egalitarian on the societal level, an individual cannot tol-
erate the fact that someone else lives better than he does. As a utilitarian (on
the individual level), he wishes to live better than someone else, and finds it
morally acceptable. As an egalitarian, he is well-aware that others will turn
against him. Therefore he will not attempt to improve his position within the in-
stitutionally allowed business activities - which was not possible in socialism
anyway - but rather within the framework of "invisible" activities, such as "grey"
or even "black economy", including corruption and crime. The combination of
two social codes in a situation of greater economic opportunities has been an
important parameter of the socio-cultural dynamics in the former USSR and
some other socialist countries.
The egalitarianism which does not only tend to equalize opportunities, but al-
so finaloutcomes in the distributive process, along with a whole battery of col-
lective attitudes which I referred to as "egalitarian syndrome" in 1969, (Žup-
anov, 1969) and which could also be terrned egalitarian ideology, provides the
content of the bottom-top communication in the "social contract" system. The
political elite has accepted this ideology as part of its programme, as the fun-
damental premise of the institutional system of business operation and politi-
cal decision-making. However, rulers have not accepted it as a "blueprint" of
their own lives." The elitist endorsement of egalitarianism for others, but not for
8
This was the function of "potlatch" in the Kwakiutl tribe, where ceremoniai burning of one's own
property increased the social standing of an individual. Similar behaviour could be found in former
Yugoslavia: extravagant feasts, lighting cigarettes with banknotes in taverns, sticking banknotes to
the forhead of a Gipsy singer etc. "Potlatch", however, had other functions in the distribution with-
in the community. Marcel Mauss (1960) Essai sur le don, Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris, P.U.F
9
The exclusion of the elite's personal consumption and way of life from the egalitarian scheme was
partly institutional or semi-institutional (e.g. special shops, da chas and summer resorts, special
sanatoriums etc.), and partly non-institutional (e.g., "gifts" of various companies to political leaders
and state functionaries, or even criminal activities, such as corruption and the like).
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themselves, is the essential factor of social dynamics." This will be discussed
in more detail in the second part of this study.
On the other hand, the endorsement of the egalitarian codex has a consider-
able impact on the content of top-bottom communication. Ideological postu-
lates of state ownership and administration, along with the derived political
system, are in the function of "realization" of egalitarian ideology. Egalitarian
distribution is a complicated process of constant redistributions. The process
of redistribution always requires a redistributive mechanism. In traditional com-
munities, where the redistribution is limited in its extent, customs, such as the
exchange of equivalent gifts, provide a sufficient mechanism. (Mauss, 1960)
ln a larger and more complex society, this role can only be carried out by the
state." To be sure, the redistributive function is carried out by the state both in
capitalism and socialism. Without making detailed comparisons here, I shall
just say that the capitalist state performs the redistributive function mainly out-
side the economic sector, ceding the (re)allocative economic function to the
autonomous market mechanism. In socialism, the economic sector is included
in redistribution processes, which ensures the range and permanence of so-
cial entitlements which could not be ensured by the state-operated redistribu-
tion outside the economic sector. In other words, the "social contract" cannot
be realized without state ownership and administration. Therefore, the ideolo-
gy of state ownership and state running of economy was not merely imposed;
it was accepted because it was functionally indispensable.
The state redistribution had its economic, but also its social and political price,
which left no room to special interest groups and the pluralist political system.
The absence of political pluralism dangerously increased the strains in the sys-
tem as a whole, arising from the combination of diverse value codes and the
exemption of the elite from the egalitarian distribution.
10
The communist political elite was more prone to accumulating wealth illegally than the American
elite, since in the U.SA the individual accumulation of wealth is institutionally allowed and actual-
ly possible. On the other hand, the "red" elite risked much less being caught in illegal activities,
since it had a complete control of the media, the police and the judiciary. It could not, however, con-
trol indiscretion and rumours of malpractices. The fact that these offences usually went unpun-
ished, both legally and politically, intensified moral revolt. In the first period the revolt was mainly
in the form of "criticism from within" which consisted of accusations that the system did not act in
keeping with its own fundamental ideology. In the stage of decline, the elite became the target of
"criticism from without" which required the change of the system. An individual citizen felt helpless,
since any autonomous group action was forbidden. Consequently, he became "alienated" and tried
to "lay his hands on something" illegally himself. This resulted in the f10urishing of petty crime on a
large scale, which was either partly tolerated (Millar and Wolchik, 1944, pp. 21-24) or simply con-
sidered "delit chevaleresque", such as stealing a book from a library or avoiding taxes.
11
Of course, voluntary non-profit organizations ("the third sector") are also a redistributive mecha-
nism in democratic countries.
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The majority of authors dealing with transition and communist sociallegacy
have not been aware of the egalitarian ideology and its importance for the "so-
cial contract"; they have ignored the fact that official ideology was not (mere-
ly) imposed on the population. Consequently, they could not perceive the
"communist legacy" from the viewpoint of a dynamic system (the "communist
world") which has broken down.
A question apart is why Western12 (especially American) social scientists have
failed to understand radical - ega/itarian ideology. Even a perceptive analyst,
such as Ken Jowitt, who saw clearly that the "limited good" perspective was
embedded in the Leninist culture, was not fully aware that it was a constituent
part of egalitarian ideology. (Jowitt, 1992, 67-8) lt cannot be said that the few
existing studies dealing with radical egalitariansism were not available be-
cause of the language barrier;" They were, rather, "culturally unavailable";
someone who experienced his primary socialization in the American culture
could not understand radical egalitarianism any better than an average
Russian could understand individual rights and freedoms. This idea has never
existed in the American culture. However, there is a a variant of egalitarian ide-
ology which belongs to the American culturallegacy. (Lipset, 1967) Some ele-
ments of the "egalitarian syndrome" could be found in the past, such as anti-
intellectualism (Merton, 1957) and antiprofessionalism (de-professionalization
of medicine in Jackson's America was similar in many respects to de-profes-
sionalization of medicine during the Cultural Revolution in China). (Rus and
Arzenšek, 1984, 259). These elements, however, have been cast into deep
oblivion today. Therefore, American social scientists were unable to cross the
boundaries of their own culture, unlike social anthropologists on the Pacific is-
lands where theyacted as participant observers. This method was pratically
inapplicable in socialist countries.
The reader is bound to ask the following question: "Your explanation might be
applicable to the former USSR and former Yugoslavia, Le. to countries with
peasant majority where 'the authentic revolution,' to use Marxist jargon, had
taken place. Can it be applied also to countries where the revolution was im-
ported on tanks and where the majority of population was not peasant?" The
question is appropriate indeed, but J cannot answer it here, because a reliable
answer can be provided only by specialized research. Studies which have ap-
peared so far do not offer an answer, since this question was not the subject
of their research.
12
An exception is Nicole Janigro (1989) Elite politica e classe operaia: una coalizione 'elastica'. in
Stefano Bianchini (ed.), L'enigma jugoslavo -le ragioni della crisi, Milano, Franco Angeli Libri s.r.1.
13
J. Županov's study "Egalitarianism and Industrialism" was published in America in 1978. Besides,
basic information on the egalitarian value orientation in Yugoslavia could be found by American
readers in the book by Sharon Zukin (1975) Beyond Marx and Tito, Cambridge University Press,
passim.
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II. REFORM AND THE IICOALITION11
- THE YUGOSLAV CASE
ln current discussions it has been completely forgotten that contemporary tran-
sition was preceded by another "transition", Le. by efforts to switch from the
centrally planned to "market-planned" economy, which was referred to as the
"economic reform". The attempted reform ended in complete failure. It was fol-
lowed by the "anticommunist revolution" which triggered the process of transi-
tion to capitalist market economy and multiparty democracy.
The reform of socialism first started in socialist Yugoslavia, where the reform
process reached its peak," so that I shall limit my discussion to that reform.
First, I have to answer the question of why we should return to the past now,
no matter how recent it was. The reform tried to unravel the Gordian knot of
socialism in communist countries; having failed to do so, the "anticommunist
revolution" tried to cut it with a sword. The attempt, however, did not unravel
the knot completely; if it had succeeded, we would not be dealing with the
"communist legacy" now.
Why did the reform fail? I shall try to explain this by analyzing the case of
Yugoslavia. My explanation, however, will have wider implications. In my 40-
year research on reforms, I have come to the conclusion that neither the rul-
ing elite nor manual workers had any real interest in the success of the reform.
The ruling elite lacked this interest because:
1) the success of the reform would bring about considerable changes in the
structure of the elite, resulting in the redistribution of power. It is highly proba-
ble that the managerial elite, whom the political elite wanted to keep perma-
nently in the position of 'junior partner' although its members were originally re-
cruited from the ruling elite, would attain leading positions. With the growing
professionalization of top managers (directors), the political elite was less and
less willing to accept such a change; (Županov, 1995)
(2) the ruling elite would have to accept technical and scientific establishment
as a partner participating in political power on an equal footing, which it had al-
ways resolutely refused, so that the very word partnership was proscribed. The
ruling elite did not allow partnersips for the following reasons: first, they would
entail a change in the social and ideolog ica I basis of its legitimacy, which was
extremely risky. Secondly, a new coalition would establish and legalize the plu-
ralism of elites, undermining the one-party political system. The ruling elite and
14
Economically, it was on the brink of success with Marković's "new socialism", but politically it had
no chance of success with Milošević as the strongman. On the concept of "new socialism", see
Dragomir Vojnić, (1989) Ekonomska kriza i reforma socijalizma, (Economic Crisis and Reform of
Socialism), Zagreb, Globus, (p. 225-241)
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the party would thus lose their political monopoly in society. In their view, that
would be "the end of the world," i.e., the end of their idea of socialism. The elite
could perhaps accept changes within its own structure. It could even go so far
as to accept changes in the social (ideological) basis of its legitimacy, but it
was absolutely unwilling to accept the loss of its political monopoly in society.
To sum up, the reform had no chance of success.
Manual workers were not really interested in the success of the reform for two
reasons:
(1) the success of the reform would entail the (re-)establishment of the com-
petitive labor market, where the working class would be exposed to a great
deal of uncertainty and insecurity. Socialist economy acted as a "protective
cover" which could be compared in its effects to the Spenhamland system in
England in the first third of the nineteenth century. (Polanyi, 1968) The
Spenhamland system brought about the separation of workers' survival from
their productivity, which occurred in socialist systems as well. In this way, local
paternalism in England hindered any rise in wages and even reduced them.
Likewise, the socialist state paternalism impeded any considerable rise in the
wages and standard of living. (Županov, 1995, 63) ln short, workers preferred
the umbrella of total state protection to the partial and conditional protection
offered by trade unions;
(2) manual workers in Yuqoslavla, and in most other socialist countries, saw
no intrinsic value in work as vocation, or Beruf in Puritan ethics. They were
even less prepared to consider work as the "prime need" according to the
Marxist ideology. In order to attribute some social value to work, it was neces-
sary to resort to other value codes, such as "revolutionary heroism", "sacrifice",
"self-denial", "dedication to work," etc. Revolutionary enthusiasm and self-de-
nial did not last long. Voluntary work drives on Saturdays (Communist subot-
nici) soon disappeared in Soviet Russia. The movement to increase produc-
tivity (Stakhanovism) persisted longer, but without the initial zeal. The enthusi-
asm for storming work in Yugoslavia was short-lived. Hard work, Le. system-
atical and methodical everyday work required by modern economy, cannot be
based on these codes. As in traditional society, work remained an external ne-
cessity which anyone 'in his right mind' tried to avoid.
That attitude to work was most significantly determined by socialist economy
itself. "The socialist industrialization" in general and the fetishism of heavy in-
dustry and huge organizations in particular soaked up a large portion of the
gross national product. Furthermore, state economy made highly inefficient
use of assets, which resulted in heavy losses. Since socialist economy relied
mainly on its own resources," the national "fund" of wages and salaries was
15
The Socialist Yugoslavia was an exception in this respect: non-repayable loans from 1950 to 1959
were considerable. Thus the US economic assistance from 1950 to 1959 amounted to 1,153.4 mil-
ion dollars, not to mention the counterpart withdrawals for Yugoslav use, as of June 1959 totaling
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limited and kept at a rather low level. In this situation, it was reasonable from
the workers' point of view "not to overwork themselves," and to minimize their
work contribution to the lowest acceptable level. The socialist state protected
the worker not only from the labour market, but from work itself! Lafargue's
(Lafargue, 1978) "right to laziness?" was thus apparently attained in a trivial-
ized form.
lt is obvious that interests of the political elite and workers converged regard-
ing the preservation of the economic and social status quo. Workers saw their
narrow socio-economic interests as more important than their actual participa-
tion in political power, while political elite was more concerned with the reten-
tion of political monopoly as the highest priority, than with economic efficiency.
A deal, or a "social contract" was possible on the basis of this congruence of
interests. To use my terms, it was the basis of the "coalition between political
elite and manual workers".
lt took me years of work and research to understand that which seems self-ev-
ident today. In the text that follows, I shall reca pitu late briefly the results of
many years of my study and research.
1) First Insights into the Problem
When the first economic reform was introduced in 1965, I carried out an em-
pirical research in 10 industrial firms in Osijek to determine basic attitudes of
employees to market economy. The question about the attitude to state price
control was used as a test to determine the attitude to market economy. The
survey showed that employees in general and skilled workers and office staff
in particular favoured price control. The senior staff was divided: one half was
in favour of price control, while the other half was against it. As many as 37.8%
managers favoured price control. (Županov, 1985,52) These data confirmed
my hypothesis concerning the existence of a "mass basis of etatism." Having
paid verbal tribute to free market pricing in the period of "administrative so-
cialism" which preceded the economic reform, politics could always appeal to
the protection of the living standard of working people, especially of those with
low incomes. Invoking the living standard and workers'solidarity could strike a
60,956 million dinars. Aid received from other Western countries (primarily from Great Britain and
France) totalled roughly 219 million dollars in the same period. - George W. Hoffman and Fred W.
Neal (1962), Yugoslavia and the New Communism, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, pp 351,
353 and 354. Although the loans covered losses and enabled a higher level of pay than in other
socialist countries, this was not sufficient for Yugoslavia to' join developed European countries in
this respect.
16
"The requests of the right to work and to remuneration according to needs do not express so much
the desire to work as the wish for concealed loating and pay without work". A. Hlavek (1969)
"Projekt socijalizma i njegovo ostvarivanje" (The Project of Socialism and its Realization), Gledišta,
5, p. 742.
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responsive chord in deeper altitudes based on the cognitive perspective of
"limited good" and redistributive orientation. I shall quote here the observation
of V. Bakarić regarding "Our bureaucracy" ("Our bureaucracy" referred to rev-
olutionaries turned bureaucrats who were still dedicated to the Communist
cause, as distinguished from "other bureaucrats" who were an unwanted by-
product of the "deformation of Socialism"), where he claimed that modern
etatism had developed from the "revolutionary etatism" which had mass sup-
port, especially among workers. (Županov, 1985, 74-75)
At the time, however, I could not fully determine which social stratum was ac-
tually the exponent of statist policy. Who were "Our bureaucrats?" Who was
right: Milovan Ojilas when he claimed that the top politicalleadership beJonged
to this category, (Ojilas, 1966) or Trotsky who maintained that the political es-
tablishment was exempt from the category of "bureaucrats who had betrayed
the revolution"? (Trotski, 1973) I could not imagine that the political elite could
sabotage their own project of workers' self-management and "socialist com-
modity production" because, in spite of the Ranković scandal, I believed the
political elite to be monolithic. Most analyses presenting the division within the
political elite into reformist and anti-reformist streams in other socialist coun-
tries did not even exist at the time. Moreover, I could not understand how
"some other bureaucrats" in state administration could sabotage projects of
the politicalleadership. True enough, a similar case was reported by S.M.
Lipset in the Canadian state of Saskatchewan (Lipset, 1950) after the Socialist
victory at the elections, but it seemed impossible that an experience of this
kind could be repeated in the Yugoslav one-party system. Therefore, in my
analysis at the time, I could not proceed beyond the current slogan of "etatism"
which is, sociologically, a mere abstraction.
2) The Elaboration of the Problem
I was inclined to explain the existence of pro-statist altitudes on such a mas-
sive scale by the fact that the working class was in its early formative period,
so that the tradition of "revolutionary etatism" was still strong. Soon after my
research in Osijek, however, I came to the conclusion that workers' attitudes
had deeper roots reaching back into traditional society. Therefore I placed my
further considerations within the context of social modernization. The result
was a controversial paper entitled "Egalitarianism and Industrialism" which I
submitted at the sociological symposium in Split in 1969.
ln my paper, I tried to present theoretically the concept of egalitarianism, with
its specific variant which I later referred to as 'radical egalitarianism'. Since I
did not want to limit my discussion to conceptual analysis, I illustrated this vari-
ant with available empirical data and non-systematic observations from daily
press. An important component of my future theory of 'coalition' was thus ex-
plained.
438
DRUŠ. IsmAt. ZAGREB/GOD. 5 (1996), BR. 2 (22), sm. 425-455 ŽUPANOV, J.: THE SOCIAL. ..
That is not all. Having borrowed from Gunnar Myrdal (1968, I, 19,26) the con-
cept of the 'social matrix' as a potential inhibitor of industrial development, I re-
defined the 'mass basis of etatism' as the 'social matrix' whose essential com-
ponents are the egalitarian value complex, low standard of living and a way of
life interwoven with traditional cultiJral patterns. Since I was dissatisfied with
the concept of 'etat ism' as an ideological chimery, I wanted to find the actual
group interests underlying this label. I defined the ruling group as the 'political
substructure of social stratification'. This group was constantly exposed to de-
mands of the working population to abolish social privileges and inequalities
and thus adapt the actual social-economic situation to the central social value.
Trapped between the social ideal of radical egalitarism (Sollen) and the fact of
the social and economic differentiation (Sein), the ruling group performed re-
markable maneuvers. They launched from time to time large-scale campaigns
against 'social differences,' finding the scapegoat usually among members of
the middle classes, such as abstract painters, intellectuals with additional in-
comes earned on the market of intellectual services, private owners, technoc-
racy etc. Campaigns were usually launched from the top. They were followed
by ideological turnu lt and threats of repressive and restrictive measures. After
a while, they reached lower levels of the system, and some administrative
measures were taken, with poor practical results. Finally, everything slowly
subsided." An average campaign lasted for about six months.
lt would be a mistake to reduce" these campaigns to cheap political trickery:
they were a very serious matter both for the masses and the elite.
"The campaign is an attempt to revert the whole social situation, and go back
to the stage of the revolutionary movement which preceded its institutionaliza-
tion and formalization. The existing situation which caused discontent was
'deleted from the magnetic tape', and the development started anew with great
promises given by the political bureaueracy that things would develop differ-
ently in the future. To be sure, existing trends could not be abolished and soon
everything returned to the usual. The political bureaueracy, however, played
for time, gaining perhaps as many as several years. In the 1970's, for instance,
strikes ceased temporarily in response to the anti-technocracy campaign, con-
stitutional changes and the SIZ (SIZ - "Selfmanagement Community of
Interest" was a parastatal institution for financing public services (health, edu-
cation, science, social work etc.). They were instituted by the Associated
Labour Act), to be continued at the end of the 1970's. After that, new cam-
paigns were in prospect." (Županov, 1983,39)
3) Formulating the Theory
lt took me years to formulate the theory completely. Its completion was due to
the grave recession at the beginning of the 1980's, when I asked the key ques-
17
For instance, well-known campaigns which were triggered off by the Letter of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1958 or by Tito's speech in Split in 1962. In
the case of the students' movement in 1968, the campaign was launched from "below".
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tion: What is the main actual (not declarative) aim of the Yugoslav social-eco-
nomic system? The answer was facilitated by frequent economic restrictions,
which revealed the scale of priorities of the system. The main aim could be
found in the elements which the system was absolutely unwilling to sacrifice or
which were the last to be sacrificed. "Sacrifices" (restrictions) were made in the
following order: (1) personal consumption and standard, where the system
was willing to reach the poverty line, (2) "collective consumption", or social
payments, where the system was prepared to abolish some privileges and in-
stitutions, (3) "general consumption", Le. government expenses, where the
system was willing to make some "sacrifice". On the basis of this, I concluded
that the system was least ready to sacrifice investments. Why were invest-
ments such an important, untouchable priority? To answer this question, one
should have in mind that throughout the socialist period the economic devel-
opment was "extensive" rather than "intensive" which, to use Kindleberger's
terms, meant "growth" rather than "development" (Kindieberger, 1965).
Despite formal declarations that the reform would enable the transition from
extensive growth to intensive development, this had never happened.
Quantitative development relied on classical technology and mass employ-
ment of unskilled workers, while scientific knowledge and human resources
were completely neglected.
What was the purpose of this quantitative growth? An analysis done by the
Fabbian Group of the British Labour Party entitled "The New Left - An
Economic Analysis" helped me to answer that question. The new left consist-
ed of employees of local authorities and voluntary agencies belonging to wel-
fare professions: teachers, 'social workers, social care and housing advisors,
"researchers" etc. Members of that social group made their living on "poverty
management", thus ensuring themselves their middle-class position and stan-
dard of living. Therefore their essential class interest was to perpetuate pover-
ty, keeping the number of social cases - their clients - on the same permanent
level in town centers from which the middle classes had moved out. In this way
they actively perpetuated poverty.
Then I asked the following question: which social group in Yugoslavia provid-
ed the social basis for the power and the high living standard of political bu-
reaucracy? Whose interest was not to reduce, but to increase that social
group? The answer was: "manual workers, who were relatively poorly educat-
ed, poorly paid, who lived in poor f1ats, who lacked trade union awareness and
experience of struggle on the labour market, forming a group which was con-
stant/y enlarged by newcomers from the country. This group was identified with
the 'historical working class,' and it provided the source of the historical legiti-
macy of political bureaueracy. At the same time they provided pliable material
which could be manipulated in the game against other social strata that had
certain aspirations to participate in the power (intellectuals, technocrats).
There is an essential difference between the relationship between the political
bureaueracy and manual workers on the one hand and that between leftist
.d.dn
DRUŠ. ISTRAž. ZAGREB/GOD. 5 (1996), BR. 2 (22), STR. 425-455 ŽUPANOV, J.: iHE SOCIAL. ..
Labourists and slum proletariat on the other. Welfare proponents did not cre-
ate a mass political basis in the apathetic city poor which did not accept their
attitudes. On the other hand, political bureaucracy found its political and social
basis in manual workers. Mutual communication was established in which
manual workers accepted t,he ideology of political bureaucrocy, and political
bureaucracy endorsed egalitarian values and attitudes of manual workers.
Thus itCWasthe vital interest of bureaucracy to perpetuate the working class
social stratum. Extensive economic growth was the best source for the repro-
duction of this group. Qualitative development would intellectualize the work-
ing population and put at the forefront technical intelligentsia and science,
which political bureaucracy would have to integrate on the western techno-
cratic model. Thus it would have to change the basis of its historical legitima-
cy. These changes would be extremely risky, and bureaucracy did not accept
risks. It wanted to preserve the status quo, where there was no room for sci-
entific knowledge. (Županov, 1983, 1052-54)
Thus, the theory of coalition was formulated as early as 1983, only the term
"coalition" was not used at the time. It was used for the first time in the dis-
cussion at the round table organized by the Belgrade periodical Ekonomika in
the same year.
4) The Elaboration of the Theory
The term "coalition" was used for the first time in the above mentioned dis-
cussion in the following way:
"The basic coalition is that between the political elite and manual workers. It is
not a coalition of equals, since it consists of the 'protector' and the 'proteqe',
This ideology found expression in the slogan about the protection of self-man-
agement by the state ...To consolidate the deal, the working classes had to be
provided for. They were therefore granted job security and a pay which was not
very high, but which was stable. This explains the fantastic job security in all
the socialist countries. It was a part of the deal. The social background of the
working class also played an important part in the deal, since the majority of
its members, especially those coming from mountainous areas, had led an ex-
istence of utter depravity and poverty. Thus, their present situation fared very
well compared to their previous circumstances. That was another important el-
ement of the coalition." (Županov, 1987,93)
Along with the term "coalition", I used the term "deal" which is semantically very
close to that of the "social contract". I also hinted at the idea that this could be
applied to other socialist countries. I pointed out that an important function of
the radical egalitarianism, and a constituent part of the coalition, was to di-
minish differentiation in the social system, and thus facilitate the management
of the system by the elite. (Županov, 1987, 92)
441
DRUŠ. ISl'RAŽ. ZAGREB/GOD. 5 (1996), BR. 2 (22), STR. 425-455 ŽUPANOV, J.: THE SOCIAL...
5) The Completing the Theory and Empirical
Testing of the Strength of the Coa lit ion
My theory was completed in 1986, when I wrote the chapter entitled "The
Working Class and Social Stability" (1987) for the second edition of my book
Sociologija i samoupravljanje (Sociology and Self-Management). (Županov,
1987) The chapter was based on a survey of the culture of young workers,
(Ilišin et al., 1986) which enabled me to formulate more precisely the theory on
the coalition between the ruling elite and the working class.
"It is an unequal coalition in which the elite acts as a patron that 'protects' work-
ers by ensuring them minimal pay and extensive social rights, while the pro-
tege, disguised as the historical working class ('the historical interest') secures
the elite its social legitimacy. Such a coalition implies the establishment of a
two-way communication in the social 'software', 18 workers accepting the official
ideology, and the elite endorsing the values of radical egalitarianism. These
values are not endorsed by the elite out of sincere egalitarian convictions, but
because the levelling of differences among people simplifies the social system
and facilitates its management." (Županov, 1987, 140-1)
Furthermore, I pointed to another important function of the coalition as the ba-
sis of social stability. Until the time of Milošević's putseh in Serbia in 1987,
Yugoslavia could boast an amazing social stability, with the only exception of
Kosovo. 'The collapse of living standard, which endangered the physical exis-
tence of a large part of the population, did not provoke public protest; there
was no strike movement, no public manifestations of discontent. Despite
everything, the indispensable minimum of social participation was ensured."
(Županov, 1985, 139)
A great deal of strain in the coalition was brought about by the recession, since
it called into question the ability of the elite to carry out its part of the deal,
which consisted in the stability of employment and income, as well as in ex-
tensive social rights. Otherwise, workers could refuse to carry out their part.
Therefore, I wanted to test the strength of the coalition and see how much
strain it could withstand. The figures indicating the endorsement of official ide-
ology by young workers were taken as indicators of the strength of the coali-
tion. The figures were obtained in a survey which was carried out in Croatia in
1982. The results, which showa strong endorsement of the official ideology,
including official institutions, politics and definitions of social reality, are pre-
sented in the following order:
18
ln the discussion at the round table organized by the journal Economics, the author compared so-
ciety to the computer, with certain social codes and value orientations representing the software,
and class interest providing the hardware. (Županov, 1987, 86)
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(1) The Endorsement of the Institutions of the System
(a) Attitudes to the Communist Party (in %)






(aa) Recent Social Influence and Reputation of the Communist Party (in %)
- on considerable increase
- has not changed
- in decline







(b) Definitions of the Socialist State (in %)
- positive (official) definition
- negative definitions




(c) The Official Trade Union (opinions in %)
- an independent workers' organization of interest
(the official definition)
- acting on behalf of the management




Bearing in mind their actual role as transmission of the ruling party on the top
level and a sort of company union on the level of firm, trade unions fared well.
lt is evident that the official ideological definition of the role of trade unions had
a decisive influence on the perception of a significant number of respondents,
although not on the absolute majority.
(d) The Perception of the Delegation System (in %)








To be sure, the delegation system was such a monstruous creation that most
respondents failed to understand it. However, the number of opponents, who
saw the delegation system as a disguise for the one-party system or, in the
best case, as a system of economic democracy without political democracy,
was below 20 per cent.
ln order to examine the accuracy of answers about the delegation system, a
direct question was asked concerning the attitude to one-party system.
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The answers were highly instructive (in %)
- unconditional support of one-party system
- conditional support of one-party system as
a temporary and short-term solution








ln short, respondents were divided into two approximately equal groups:
staunch supporters of the authoritarian system and the uncommitted. The op-
position to the one-party system "because it is a totalitarian regime" was very
weak (6.7).
(2) Endorsement of the Official Politics









(b) Attitudes to the Reform of Secondary Education (in%)
- positive
- negative




Although "Šuvar's reform" (That was an ambitious and far-reaching reform pro-
ject of secondary education inspired by the Party and executed with utmost
zeal in Croatia by the Commissioner for Education Stipe Šuvar. This reform
aimed at levelling the system of secondary education (by bringing elitist gym-
nasiums and vocational schools for skilled workers to the same level), and at
installing the narrow program specialization along the lines of factory, was met
with hostility in Croatia, especially in intellectual circles, it was fully endorsed
by respondents.
(e) The Employment Policy for Young People
Answers (in %) to the question of who should be concerned with the employ-
ment of young people were very interesting.
- the state







The ideologically correct answer was that self-management firms should be
concerned with employment. This was not, however, endorsed by respondents
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since it would imply the breach of the 'contract'. Therefore, respondents insist-
ed that it should be the concern of the state government, as it was in all the
other socialist countries.
(d) The Financing of Public Services (in %)
While the respondents departed from official ideology in answering the ques-
tion on employment, they endorsed it again in the question on financing the
public services:
- return to the state (budget) financing
- development of the "system of free exchange of labor"







Although this was a sensitive question from the viewpoint of the "deal", most
respondents were in favour of parastatal self-managing communities of inter-
est. However, more than one third of respondents were reserved in their atti-
tudes to these parasitic organizations. Self-managing communities of interest
did not call into question the realization of the "deal".
(3) The Endorsement of Official Definitions of Social Situation
(a) The Perception of the Social Class Structure
The question about the existence of class differences in Yugoslav society was
answered in the following way (in %):
- class differences do not exist any more
- there are no significant class differences
- there are certain differences, but they are not class differences







ln short, the socialist Yugoslavia was seen as a classless society.
(b) The Perception of Exploitation (in%)
- it exists only in the private sector
- it exists both in the private and social sector






A large number of respondents believed that exploitation existed in the social
sector. Did they consider the exploitation in the social sector to be "class ex-
ploitation", as opposed to that in the private sector? We should bear in mind
here the government manipulated "business conditions" due to which some
firms and branches were favoured, while others were treated with d isfavou r.
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(e) Can Workers Protect Themselves from Exploitation?
We can summarize the answers in the following way (in %):
- there is no exploitation in Yugoslav society
- YES, by individual action inside the system
- YES, by collective action outside the system
- YES, by individual action outside the system






According to most answers, exploitation did not exist, and if it did, a worker
could protect himself by individual action inside the system. According to re-
spondents, action outside or against the system did not "pay off'. This view
was ideologically correct, but it did not correspond to reality, since strikes ac-
tually paid off quite often. The management gave in to strikers' demands for
reasons which need not be explained here. Individual action paid off even bet-
ter. It was exemplified in the questionnaire by feigned sick leaves and workers'
stealing from their firms' supplies. Respondents, however, did not approve of
action outside, or against the system.
(d) The Perception of Workers' Social Position
Workers' perception of their own social position is perhaps the most telling in-
dicator of the intensity of their endorsement of the official ideology (in %):
A. The Official Definition (Ideology)
- workers are creators who produce material goods
using their knowledge and abilities
- workers are self-managers, who decide about
all important issues in their firms
36.4
28.1 64.5
B. Unofficial Definition (Fact)
- hired labourer
- poor man who lives in privati on and whose
circumstances do not improve
- caught in a trap: cannot extricate himself
from his position as a worker
- robot who performs fragmented operations







lt is understandable Why workers did not think they were hired labourers: in
self-management socialism labour relations were defined as status or mem-
bership relations rather than as market relations. It is also understandable why
they did not feel they were human robots - only a minority actually worked on
the asembly line, although the exact figures are lacking. We can also under-
stand why the modality of "being caught in a trap" got negligibly few answers,
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since a peasant who became worker rose on the social status scale in tradi-
tional society. Moreover, new members of the elite were recruited from among
skilled and highly skilled workers. The process was actually completed by mid-
1960's, (Zukin, 1978,399) but memories were still alive; besides, Šuvar's re-
form of education nourished aspirations to mobility. Thus, for instance, graffit-
ti with slogans such as "Workers to the University!" could be found on many fa-
cades. However, the fact that only one tenth of respondents chose the modal-
ity of "poor man living in privation whose circumstances do not improve" was
very far from the actual situation.
On the other hand, the view of industrial work as a creative activity was far
from reality in a situation where self-management was centered on the firm
rather than on the working group, as opposed to workers' participation in
Sweden. Actually, negligibly few rationalizations and useful suggestions were
submitted by workers. The view of workers as self-managers deciding about
all important issues was likewise far from truth, since all important decisions
were made by directors, top executives and political functionaries from inside
and outside the company. The function of workers' councils consisted mainly
in giving the whole affair a sembiance of legality.
Why did respondents ignore their practical experience and give "politically cor-
rect" answers? They were induced to do so by the way in which the questions
were formulated. If they had answered from their experience they would have
discredited the ideology, which they did not want to. If the questionnaire had
consisted of open-ended questions, few respondents would have mentioned
the fictitious creativity involved in their job or significant decision-making in
their firms."
ln short, answers to these questions were highly indicative: they showed that
respondents saw institutions and politics, as well as their own personal posi-
tion, through ideological glasses. Although respondents did not give unam-
biguous answers to all questions, it was more than evident that most of them
favoured the official ideology. Ad mittedIy, we did not ask highly 'theoretical'
questions, with the exception of the following: "Does the dictatorship of the
proletariat exist in Yugoslav society?"
The answers revealed utter confusion, with only 10.1 per cent giving the ideo-
logically correct answer: that the dictatorship of proletariat becomes stronger
with the growing importance of associated laboUr in the distribution of income.
Great dispersion and confusion in answers to this question shows the cogni-
tive level at which the official ideology was received.
Finally, a methodological caveat is appropriate. Our sample was made up of
young workers, most of whom lived in urban centres, which was certainly an
19
On the influence of the formulation of survey questions on answers, see John R. Zaller (1993), The
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge University Press (pp. 32-34).
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advantage. They were the best educated workers and were not among those
who had recently arrived from the country and had deep ties with their peas-
ant background. On the other hand, this was also a serious shortcoming: it ap-
pears that at the time young people in general, including workers and high-
school and university students, were more exposed to ideological influence
than older generations. (Ilišin et al., 1990) Therefore, without doubting the va-
lidity of the thesis about the intense top-bottom communication, we should
take the figures on the strength of this communication cum grano salis.
III. THE CROATIAN DEVIATION:
THE AFTERMATH.EFFECT?
Naturally, Croatian readers are interested in the "sociallegacy of communism"
in their own country, but Millar-Wolchik's book does not say a word about the
SUbject. All the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia, including
Slovenia, were left out in the American research. A few indications of this lega-
cy can be found in the journal published by Glasgow University which was for-
merly entitled Soviet Studies, and has now changed its title to Europe-Asia
Studies (Rose and Haerpfer, 1994). The survey entitled "The National
Democratic Barometer", which was carried out in 1992, covered 1O postcom-
munist countries, including Slovenia and Croatia. Figures on the communist
legacy are scarcer than those in the American research. Besides, they are not
comparable because of differences in the wording of questions. We shall nev-
ertheless try to see what these figures reveal.
First, it is possible to draw indirect inferences about the communist legacy from
the figures which reveal the positive evaluation of the economic and political
system before the collapse of communism in ten countries. Respondents were
asked to evaluate the functioning of these systems on a scale ranging from mi-
nus 100 to plus 100. It is reasonable to assume that the "social contract" was
an important parameter for this evaluation.
Table 1
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lt is evident that Croatia radically departs from other countries included in the
survey, with the lowest number of positive scores.
The other group of figures regards collectivistic, as opposed to individualistic
values, in survey questions. Thus, in the question on wages, respondents
were asked to choose between equal pay for all and the dependence of pay
on individual achievement. In the question on welfare, respondents could
choose between the state vs. individual concern for the welfare of the individ-
ual. In the question on ownership, respondents were asked to choose between
state ownership and private enterprise. In the question on employment, re-
spondents chose between a poorly paid but secure job and a job which was
well-paid but insecure.
Table 2
Collectivistic values (in %)
Country Income Welfare Ownership Employment
Bulgaria 41 63 47 65
Hungary 31 60 24 73
Slovenia 30 55 20 85
Croatia 29 40 15 47
Ukraine 28 57 52 39
Poland 23 85 31 67
Belorus 22 52 46 65
Romania 22 52 46 65
Slovakia 13 57 27 37
The Czech Republic 10 46 17 48
Source: Rose and Haerpfer (1994)
lt could be concluded at first that the value orientation is not coherent. With re-
spect to income, the orientation to individualist values prevailed in all the coun-
tries. This is at variance with answers to the other three questions, where the
collectivist orientation was much more pronounced. The mixed individualist
and collectivist orientation should not be taken as anomalous. Different values
can actually "cohabitate" in the mind of the same individual on different levels,
which Baier and Rescher refer to as "levels of centeredness" (Baier and
Rescher, 1969, 92-5). Thus, individualist utilitarianism can dominate on the in-
dividual level, and radical egalitarianism on the societal level. The answer de-
pended on the level which the respondent had 'switch ed on' in answering the
question. Thus the majority of respondents, with the exception of those from
Ukraine, did not favour state ownership, probably because it had been politi-
cally compromised. Therefore the questions on pay and ownership cannot be
taken as good indicators of the collectivistic orientation. The concern of the
state for the welfare of the individual and job security are probably better indi-
cators of the "sociallegacy of communism" in the countries covered by the sur-
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vey. As to the state concern for the welfare of the individual, Croatia was the
last on the list, while it was the last but one regarding job security.
If we try to obtain average values for each country regarding these four as-










The Czech Republic 30.2
We can see that Croatia is the last but one - considerably behind Slovenia.
This is interesting, since both countries used to form a part of the same sys-
tem and of the same federal state. It is easy to understand why the Czech
Republic is the "most resistent" to the communist legacy: before World War II,
it was a highly developed industrial country with developed political democra-
cy. But how to explain such "resistence" in Croatia which could not be com-
pared to the Czech Republic either in economic development or democracy?
Besides these survey data, which do not warrant safe conclusions, a notorious
fact lending considerable support to such conclusions should be mentioned.
Namely, workers' self-management, which used to be the central organizing
concept in the official ideology of the Socialist Federative Republic of
YugOSlavia, has become a political taboo in present-day Croatia which has
been proscribed to a degree that can be compared to the stigmatization of the
syntagms "communist" and "communism" in the U.S.A. at the height of the cold
war.20 Even the word "worker" is not "politically correct", although it is now tol-
erated better than two or three years ago. (Županov, .1995, 136-9) There have
been no surveys of the endorsemenUrejection of self-management today, but
deeper attitudes could hardly be tapped by this kind of research. (Za ller, 1993,
24-25)
If Croatia is really a deviant case regarding the "communist legacy", which col-
lapsed 50 abruptly, the question is how and why this happened. The social ex-
20
The proscription of "self-management" has gone so far as to reject even the concept of workers'
participation, which is an essential component of the social doctrine of the Catholic church. An in-
dividual who endorses this idea publicly can easily get labelled as a "communist", which actually
happened to a religious provinciai in Zagreb. It is interesting to note that the official church, espe-
cially the local clergy, and official politics increasingly emphasize more conservative views on fam-
ily planning, abortion etc. than those more progressive ones on workers' participation, though both
form a part ofthe Catholic social doctrine. It is not within the scope of this essay to explain the dif-
ferences in the reception of the Catholic social doctrine in present-day Croatia.
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perience of the Croatian working population cannot answer the question. If we
took as our starting point the social experience which had been examined in
various previous surveys, we would expect the communist legacy in Croatia to
be stronger, or at least not weaker than in most other communist countries.
However, the reverse has happened.
A hypothetical explanation could start from the social mechanism of "ethnic
cleansing", which I outlined in my book Poslije potopa (After the Deluge)
(1995,39-40). On the individual level, one should take into account the situa-
tion in which a Serb suddenly appeared on his Croatian neighbour's doorstep
with a gun in his hand and ordered him to move out, carrying all that was left
of his/her possessions in a small plastic bag. After the first shock, the Croat
had to redefine socially his former neighbour. The exiled Croat found it utterly
impossible that his Serb neighbour could turn into the worst of enemies after
so many years of living together and being bound by close social ties. A logi-
cal "explanation" was that the neighbour had been an enemy in disguise who
now revealed his true face.
lt seems that something similar happened on the level of collective attitudes.
When the communist indoctrinated Yugoslav Army under the communist in-
signia (the red star) launched its destructive military onslaught against
Vukovar, Dubrovnik and other Croatian towns, an average Croat was forced to
redefine abruptly the whole of his social experience of the past forty years. He
suddenly saw it as a period of the "Serbian-communist conspiracy" and naked
repression, in which the Vukovar holocaust had been prepared and planned in
advance. That definition, which had been alive in political emigration all the
time, came to be accepted as a ready-made formula by the majority of the pop-
ulation. Individuals felt anger and shame for having taken part in the 'trickery'.
They tried to reconstruct the past 40 years of their life in an attempt to prove
to themselves and to others that they were victims, rather than accomplices of
the former regime, claiming that they had become members of the Communist
Party only in order to prevent greater evil. To be sure, this Orwellian self-re-
formation towards dissent and victimization has been politically profitable, but
this is not important for our present discussion.
The process of abrupt eros ion of the "communist legacy" could be interpreted
as a specific aftermath-effect of the bloody dissolution of the multinational so-
cialist state. As opposed to the results of American studies which showed that
the "aftermath-effect" existed alongside the other elements of the "communist
legacy", it seems that in Croatia all memories of the "social contract" (Le., the
coalition) and the official ideology have been thrown into the "black hole" of col-
lective amnesia.
A POSTSCRIPT INSTEAD OF THE EPILOGUE
If it is true that Croatia has deviated from other postcommunist countries, this
could have (and probably has) important political implications. These hypo-
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thetical or real implications, however, are not the subject of this essay.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no "social regime" in
Croatia anymore and that there will not be one in the future. In the December
Constitution (1990), Croatia was defined as a "social state". It must be admit-
ted that, during the war, practical politics tended to relativize this constitution-
al provision, to say the least. Such politics, however, has no future. There will
certainly be a true "social regime" in Croatia, but it will be based on the expe-
rience of Western welfare states, such as Germany in the first place. It will de-
ny any .contlnutty or even analogy with the "social contract" from the socialist
period. Other nations have had spheres of collective amnesia. Why should the
Croats be an exception?
Translated by Lidija Sočanac
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Studija je podijeljena u tri dijela. U prvom autor iznosi imanent-nu kritiku Berlinerove definicije društvenog naslijeđa komuni-
zma kao svojevrsnog "društvenog ugovora" između Partije/Drža-
ve i stanovništva, u koji je supstituirao "civilno društvo" u komu-
nističkim zemljama. Autor upozorava da se tu nije radilo o raz-
mjeni individualnih prava i sloboda za socijalne povlastice, već o
"razmjeni" legitimiteta (u korist elite) za socijalna prava i povlas-
tice (u korist zaposlenika). A ta je razmjena uključivala i dvostruku
komunikaciju između elite i mase. U drugom dijelu autor ukazuje
da je taj mehanizam legitimiziranja vlasti elite, koji je i po Berlineru
bio temelj društvene stabilnosti, on sam opisao još 1983. (teorija
o "koaliciji između politokracije i fizikalnog radništva"), stavivši ga
u širi kontekst abortivnih privrednih reformi socijalizma. U trećem
dijelu analizom kroskulturnih empirijskih nalaza dokazuje da je "ko-
munističko naslijeđe" u Hrvatskoj znatno slabije očuvano negoli u
drugim postkomunističkim zemljama te sugerira jednu interpreta-
tivnu hipotezu koja tu "hrvatsku devijaciju" objašnjava.




Kroatische Akademie der Wissenschaften
und KOnste, Zagreb
Yorliegende Studie ist in drei Abschnitte unterteilt. Im erstenTeil prasentiert der Autor seine immanente Kritik der Berliner-
schen Definition vom gesellschaftlichen Erbe des Kommunismus
als einer Art "Gesellschaftsvertrag" zwischen ParteilStaat und
Bevčlkerung, durch den die "Zivilgesellschaft" in den kommuni-
stischen tandem substituiertwurde. Der Autor betont, dar.. es sich
hier nicht um einen Tauschhandel von individuelIen Rechten und
Freiheiten gegen soziale Privilegien handelte, sondern um den
"Eintausch" von Legitimitat (zugunsten der Elite) gegen soziale
Rechte und Privilegien (zugunsten der Erwerbstatigen). Dieser
Tausch schlotš autšerdem eine zweigleisige Kommunikation zwi-
schen Elite und Masse ein. Im zweiten Teil verweist der Autor dar-
auf, dafš er selbst diese n Mechanismus elitarer Machtlegitimie-
rung, der laut Berliner die Grundlage gesellschaftlicher Stabilitat
darstellt, bereits 1983 beschrieben (Theorie der "Koalition von
Politokratie und physischer Arbeiterschaft") und im breiteren
Kontext der abortiven Wirtschaftsreformen des Sozialismus un-
tergebracht habe. Im dritten Teil wird anhand einer Analyse trans-
kultureIler empirischer Befunde der Beweis erbracht, dar.. das
"kommunistische Erbe" in Kroatien wesentlich schwacher aus-
gepragt ist als in anderen postkommunistischen tandem, sowie
eine interpretative Hypothese suggeriert, welche diese "kroati-
sche Deviation" erklart.
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